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Inactivated Japanese Encephalitis Virus Vaccine
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP)
Summary
Japanese encephalitis (JE) vaccine was available in the United States from
1983 through 1987 on an investigational basis, through travel clinics in collabo-
ration with CDC (1). JE vaccine manufactured by Biken and distributed by
Connaught Laboratories, Inc. (Japanese encephalitis virus vaccine, inactivated,
JE-VAX), was licensed on December 10, 1992, to meet the needs of increasing
numbers of U.S. residents traveling to Asia and to accommodate the needs of
the U.S. military.
INTRODUCTION
Japanese encephalitis (JE), a mosquito-borne arboviral infection, is the leading
cause of viral encephalitis in Asia (2–4 ). Approximately 50,000 sporadic and epidemic
cases of JE are reported annually from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Korea,
Japan, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and parts of Oceania. Viral transmis-
sion occurs across a much broader area of the region than is recognized by
epidemiologic surveillance (Figure 1).
JE virus is related antigenically to the flaviviruses of St. Louis encephalitis and Mur-
ray Valley encephalitis, and to West Nile virus (5 ). Infection leads to overt encephalitis
in only 1 of 20 to 1,000 cases. Encephalitis usually is severe, resulting in a fatal out-
come in 25% of cases and residual neuropsychiatric sequelae in 30% of cases (2,6 ).
Limited data indicate that JE acquired during the first or second trimesters of preg-
nancy causes intrauterine infection and miscarriage (7,8 ). Infections that occur during
the third trimester of pregnancy have not been associated with adverse outcomes in
newborns. 
The virus is transmitted in an enzootic cycle among mosquitoes and vertebrate-
amplifying hosts, chiefly domestic pigs and Ardeid (wading) birds (2 ). Culex mosqui-
toes, primarily Cx. tritaeniorhynchus , are the principal vectors. Viral infection rates in
the mosquitoes range from <1% to 3%. These species are prolific in rural areas where
their larvae breed in ground pools and especially in flooded rice fields. All elements of
the transmission cycle are prevalent in rural areas of Asia, and human infections occur
principally in this setting. Because vertebrate-amplifying hosts and agricultural activi-
ties may be situated within and at the periphery of cities, JE cases occasionally are
reported from urban locations.
JE virus is transmitted seasonally in most areas of Asia (Table 1). In temperate re-
gions, JE virus is transmitted during the summer and early fall, approximately from
May to September (2–6 ). In subtropical and tropical areas, seasonal patterns of viral
transmission are correlated with the abundance of vector mosquitoes and of verte-
brate-amplifying hosts. These, in turn, fluctuate with rainfall, with the rainy season,
and with migratory patterns of avian-amplifying hosts. In some tropical locations,
however, irrigation associated with agricultural practices is a more important factor
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affecting vector abundance, and transmission may occur year-round (9–12 ). Patterns
of JE viral transmission vary regionally, within individual countries, and from year to
year.
In areas where JE is endemic, annual incidence ranges from 1 to 10 per 10,000 (13 ).
Children <15 years of age are principally affected. Seroprevalence studies indicate
nearly universal exposure by adulthood (calculating from a ratio of asymptomatic to
symptomatic infections of 200 to 1, approximately 10% of the susceptible population
is infected per year). In developed countries of Asia and in areas where children are
Source: Tsai TF. Japanese encephalitis vaccines. In: Plotkin SA, Mortimer E, eds. Vaccines,
second edition. Philadelphia, PA: WB Saunders (in press).
FIGURE 1. Reported Japanese encephalitis cases by endemic countries and regions
of Southeast Asia where viral transmission is proven or suspected, 1986–1990
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TABLE 1. Risk of Japanese encephalitis by country, region, and season
Country Affected areas/ jurisdictions Transmission season Comments
Bangladesh Few data, probably widespread Possibly July–December as in
northern India
Outbreak reported from Tangail district
Bhutan No data No data Not applicable
Brunei Presumed to be sporadic — endemic
as in Malaysia
Presumed year-round transmission
Burma Presumed to be endemic —
hyperendemic countrywide
Presumed to be May–October Repeated outbreaks in Shan State in
Chiang Mai Valley
Cambodia Presumed to be endemic —
hyperendemic countrywide
Presumed to be May–October Refugee camp cases reported from
Thai border
Hong Kong Rare cases in new territories April–October Vaccine not routinely recommended
India Reported cases from all states except
Arunachal, Dadra, Daman, Diu,
Gujarat, Himachal, Jammu,
Kashmir,Kerala, Lakshadweep,
Meghalaya, Nagar Haveli, Orissa,
Punjab, Rajasthan and Sikkim
South India: May–October in Goa
 October–January in Tamil Nadu
 August–December in Karnataka;





Outbreaks in West Bengal, Bihar,
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andrha
Pradesh, Assam, Uttar Pradesh,
Manipure and Goa Urban cases
reported, e.g., Lucknow
Indonesia Kalimantan, Java, Bali, Lombok, Nusa
Tenggara, Sulawesi, Mollucas, and
Irian Java 
Probably year-round risk; varies by
island; peak risks associated with
rainfall, rice cultivation and
presence of pigs; November–March
peak period of risk; June–July in
some years
Human cases recognized on Bali and
Java only




Vaccine not routinely recommended
for travel to Tokyo and other major
cities. Enzootic transmission without
human cases observed on Hokkaido
Korea No data from North Korea;
South Korea sporadic — endemic
with occasional outbreaks 
July–October Last major outbreaks in 1982–1983
Laos Presumed to be endemic–
hyperendemic country wide
Presumed to be May–October No data available
Malaysia Sporadic–endemic in all states of
Peninsula, Sarawak, and probably
Sabah
No seasonal pattern; year-round
transmission
Most cases from Penang, Perak,









TABLE 1. Risk of Japanese encephalitis by country, region, and season
Country Affected areas/ jurisdictions Transmission season Comments
Nepal Hyperendemic in southern lowlands
(Terai)
July–December Vaccine recommended only for




Cases in all provinces except Xizang
(Tibet), Xinjiang, Qinghai.
Hyperendemic in southern China;
endemic — periodically epidemic in
temperate areas
Northern China: May–September
Southern China: April–October 
 (Guangshi, Yunnan, Gwangdong,
 and Southern Fujian, Szechuan,
 Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangsi provinces)
Vaccine not routinely recommended
for travelers to urban areas only 
Pakistan May be transmitted in central deltas Presumed to be June–January Cases reported near Karachi,
endemic areas overlap those for
West Nile virus
Philippines Presumed to be endemic on all islands Uncertain, speculations based on
locations and agroecosystems: West
Luzon, Mindoro, Negro Palowan:
April–November; Elsewhere:
year-round — greatest risk
April–January 
Outbreaks described in Nueva Ecija,
Luzon, and in Manila
Russia Far eastern maritime areas south of
Khabarousk
Peak period July–September First human cases in 30 years recently
reported
Singapore Rare cases Year-round transmission — April peak Vaccine not routinely recommended
Sri Lanka Endemic in all but mountainous areas;
periodically epidemic in northern
and central provinces
October–January; secondary peak of
enzootic transmission May–June.
Recent outbreaks in central
(Anuradhapura) and northwestern
provinces
Taiwan* Endemic, sporadic cases; island-wide April–October, June peak Cases reported in and around Taipei
Thailand Hyperendemic in north; sporadic —
endemic in south
May–October Annual outbreaks in Chiang Mai
Valley; sporadic cases in Bangkok
suburbs
Vietnam Endemic, hyperendemic in all
provinces
May–October Highest rates in and near Hanoi
Western Pacific Two epidemics reported on Guam,




Enzootic cycle may not be sustainable;
epidemics may follow introductions
of virus
*Local JE incidence rates may not accurately reflect risks to nonimmune visitors because of high immunization rates in local populations.
Humans are incidental to the transmission cycle. High levels of viral transmission may occur in the absence of human disease.
Note: Assessments are based on publications, surveillance reports, and personal correspondence. Extrapolations have been made from
available data. Transmission patterns may change.
— Continued
protected by immunization, a secondary increase in JE incidence has been observed
in the elderly (14 ). These observations suggest a biological basis for increased JE risk
with age because of waning immunity or other factors.
RISK FOR ACQUIRING JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS
AMONG TRAVELERS
Risk for acquiring JE among most travelers to Asia is extremely low; however, the
risk for an individual traveler is highly variable and depends on factors such as the
season, locations and duration of travel, and activities of the person. Travel during the
transmission season and exposure in rural areas, especially for extended periods of
time, are the principal factors contributing to risk. The extent and nature of outdoor
activity, use of protective clothing, bed nets and repellents, and lodging in air-condi-
tioned or well-screened rooms are additional factors that affect exposure. Residents of
developed countries usually have no natural immunity to JE virus and travelers of all
ages are equally susceptible to infection with JE virus; however, the elderly may be
more susceptible to developing neuroinvasive disease.
Although the probability of exposure to JE viral infection and illness increases with
the duration of stay in rural endemic areas, one case occurred in a traveler who made
only a few excursions into rural areas while on a 2-week vacation (15 ).
Since 1981, 11 U.S. residents have been infected with JE virus; eight were military
personnel or their dependents (Table 2) (15–17;  Tsai TF, Hoke CH, unpublished obser-
vations ). Thirteen additional JE cases have been recognized among other western
expatriates and travelers. Although figures for travelers at risk are imprecise, a crude
TABLE 2. Japanese encephalitis cases among expatriates and travelers, 1978–1992
Year Location  Occupation  Citizenship Age Sex Outcome  
1978 Beijing Diplomat Italy NA M Fatal
1981 Beijing Student U.S. 21 M Fatal
1981 NA NA Australia NA NA NA
1982 Beijing College Professor U.S. 62 M Fatal
1982 NA Soldier U.S. 32 M NA
1982 Manchuria NA Canada 36 F NA
1983 Thailand Nurse Holland 30 F Disabled
1983 NA Child U.S. 1 M NA
1983 Hong Kong Unknown U.K. 35 F Fatal
1985 Thailand Oil Field Worker Germany 30 M Fatal
1985 N. Vietnam Child E. Europe 9 M Fatal
1986 Philippines Soldier U.S. 55 M Disabled
1986 Philippines Soldier U.S. NA M Recovered
1988 NA NA U.S. 64 M NA
1988 Indonesia Child Australia 10 F Disabled
1989 Thailand Student Israel 22 F Recovered
1991 Thailand NA Austria NA NA NA
NA Thailand NA Germany NA NA NA
NA Thailand NA Denmark NA NA NA
NA NA NA Australia NA NA NA
1991 Okinawa (Japan) Soldier U.S. 20 M Disabled
1991 Okinawa (Japan) Soldier U.S. 35 M Disabled
1991 Okinawa (Japan) Soldier U.S. 28 M Recovered
1992 Singapore Child U.S. 19 M Recovered
NA – Not available
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estimate, based on the number of outbound airline passengers to Asia (2 to 3 million
U.S. citizens annually during the past 5 years [U.S. Department of Transportation, un-
published data ]), suggests that the risk of acquiring JE among U.S. travelers is <1 per
million annually. This estimate may be low because short-term travelers to developed
and urban areas probably constitute the majority of visitors to Asia and not all travel-
ers with JE will have been recognized. Moreover, between 1984 and 1987 JE vaccine
was available on a limited basis in the United States and some travelers at high risk
were protected by vaccination (1,17 ).
For travelers to rural areas where JE is endemic, risk per month of exposure can be
extrapolated from incidence rates in the resident population. Assuming an annual in-
cidence rate of 10 per 10,000, and recognizing that nearly all cases occur within a
5-month period, the estimated risk for JE during a 1-month period (the transmission
season) is 1 per 5,000 or 1 per 20,000 per week. Similar rates (<0.1–2.1 per 10,000 per
week) have been observed in non-immunized Western military personnel in Asia (data
from 1945 through 1991) (18–23 ).
The risk for developing JE after a mosquito bite can be factored into a series of
probabilities. Only bites of vector mosquitoes pose a risk and fewer than 3% of vector
mosquitoes are likely to be infected. Only one of approximately 200 infections leads to
neuroinvasive disease. The use of bed nets, insect repellents and protective clothing,
and avoidance of outdoor activity, especially during twilight periods and in the eve-
ning, will reduce risk even further.
INACTIVATED JAPANESE ENCEPHALITIS VIRUS VACCINE
An inactivated JE vaccine derived from infected mouse brain has been licensed in
Japan since 1954 (24 ). JE vaccine licensed in the United States is produced by the
Research Institute of Osaka University (Biken) and is distributed by Connaught Labo-
ratories Inc. The Biken vaccine is the most widely used JE vaccine of its type.
Similar mouse brain derived JE vaccines are produced by other manufacturers in
India, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam (25,26 ). In the PRC, inactivated
and attenuated JE vaccines are produced in primary hamster kidney cells (27,28 ).
The Biken vaccine is prepared with the Nakayama-NIH strain of JE virus, originally
isolated in 1935 from an infected human. The vaccine is produced from infected
mouse brains by a sequence of protamine sulfate treatment, formalin inactivation,
ultra-filtration, and ammonium sulfate precipitation. The vaccine is purified further by
ultracentrifugation through a sucrose cushion. Gelatin is added as a stabilizer during
several steps of the process. No myelin basic protein (MBP) can be detected in the
vaccine at a level of 2 ng/mL, the detection threshold of the MBP assay. Thimerosal is
added as a preservative. Vaccine potency is determined in comparison with a refer-
ence vaccine of known clinical efficacy.
VACCINE EFFICACY
Efficacy was demonstrated in a single placebo-controlled trial conducted in Thai-
land (13 ). The study compared the efficacy of two doses of monovalent JE vaccine
prepared with the Nakayama-NIH strain (21,628 children) with two doses of a bivalent
vaccine also containing the Beijing strain (22,080 children); 21,516 children were ad-
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ministered tetanus toxoid (TT) as a placebo. After 2 years, two JE cases were reported
among recipients of either JE vaccine and 11 cases were observed in the placebo co-
hort, for an overall vaccine efficacy of 91% (95% confidence interval [CI] of 70%–97%).
The monovalent and bivalent vaccines did not differ in their efficacy.
A prototype of the currently licensed vaccine, which was a less refined mouse
brain-derived product, was field tested in Taiwan in 1965 (29 ). Two doses of JE vac-
cine or TT were administered under masked protocol to 111,749 and 131,865 children,
respectively; 22,194 children were administered a single dose of JE vaccine and
140,514 unvaccinated children also were observed. Observations during a single year
showed rates of 4 per 100,000 in recipients of two JE vaccine doses and 18 per 100,000
in recipients of TT for a vaccine efficacy of 80%. A single vaccine dose had no demon-
strable efficacy.
IMMUNOGENICITY
Levels of neutralizing antibody that are considered protective have been defined by
animal challenge experiments (24 ). A neutralizing antibody titer of ≥1:10 in passively
immunized mice protected against challenge with 105 LD50 of JE virus, a viral dose
that might be transmitted by an infected mosquito. Thus neutralizing antibody titers ≥
1:10 (as determined by the technique used at Biken) have been presumed to protect
against natural infection.
The dosage regimen shown to be efficacious in the trials cited previously, which is
used for primary vaccination in many areas of Asia, consists of two doses adminis-
tered 1-4 weeks apart. However, immunogenicity studies in the United States and
among British subjects indicate that three doses are needed to provide protective lev-
els of neutralizing antibody in a suitable proportion of vaccinees (Table 3) (17,30 ).
Fewer than 80% of vaccinees receiving two doses seroconverted (reciprocal neutraliz-
ing antibody titer of ≥8–10). Moreover, after 6–12 months, only 29% of vaccinees still
had adequate antibody levels (17 ). The vaccine’s efficacy and immunogenicity after
two doses in Asian subjects may reflect the effects of prior immunity or subsequent
exposures to JE, West Nile, dengue, and other flaviviruses circulating in Asia (31 ).
Although exposure to flaviviruses is almost universal at an early age in developing
TABLE 3. Immunogenicity of inactivated Japanese encephalitis virus vaccine among
western subjects after two or three doses
n
Two-dose series
seroconversion rate GMT* n
Three-dose series
serconversion rate GMT
United States (17 ) 118 77% 28  72  99% 141
Nepal
British subjects (30 )  27 33% 31-61  94  88% 146-214
United States (34 )  20 80%  25 †100%†
United States§ 526 100% 140/692¶
*Geometric mean titer (reciprocal).
†Third dose at week 26.
§DeFraites R, unpublished data.
¶Day 60 serum; short and long three-dose schedules (p < .0001).
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areas of Asia, flaviviral infections are rare in North America and in most areas of
Europe.
Immunogenicity studies with another flaviviral vaccine (inactivated tick-borne en-
cephalitis [TBE] vaccine) showed that previous flaviviral infections or yellow fever
immunization augmented and accelerated the antibody response to TBE vaccine (32 ).
Preliminary studies do not indicate such an effect among JE vaccine recipients (De-
Fraites R, unpublished data ).
The vaccine was more immunogenic when administered in three doses during a
30-day period (days 0, 7, and 30) than during a shorter period of 2 weeks (days 0, 7,
and 14) (Table 3). Although all subjects seroconverted with either regimen, at 6
months geometric mean titers (GMT) were higher with the longer schedule (p<.0001)
(DeFraites R, unpublished data ).
The longevity of neutralizing antibody after primary vaccination is not known. The
GMT of vaccinees receiving three doses was unchanged between 6 months and 1 year
(1:76) after the primary series. After a booster dose was administered at 1 year, neu-
tralizing antibody titers increased sharply 3 months later to a mean titer of 1:1,117
(DeFraites R, unpublished data ). Twenty-one subjects who did not receive a booster
retained elevated antibody titers for 2 years after primary vaccination (GMT 1:105).
Additional data on the persistence of antibody are pending. In one Japanese study,
antibody titers above 1:10 persisted for 3 years after a booster dose (33 ).
ADVERSE REACTIONS
JE vaccination is associated with a moderate frequency of local and mild systemic
side effects (13,17,25,26,34,35)  (DeFraites R, unpublished data ). Tenderness, redness,
swelling, and other local effects have been reported in about 20% of vaccinees (<1%-
31%). Systemic side effects  — fever, headache, malaise, rash, and other reactions
such as chills, dizziness, myalgia, nausea, vomiting, and abdominal pain — have been
reported in about 10% of vaccinees.
The neural tissue substrate of the vaccine has raised concerns about the possibility
of vaccine-related neurologic side effects (36 ). The amount of mouse MBP in the vac-
cine, if any, is well below levels associated with an encephalitogenic effect in a guinea
pig model. Surveillance of JE vaccine-related complications in Japan during the years
1965–1973, disclosed neurologic events (principally, encephalitis, encephalopathy,
seizures, and peripheral neuropathy) among 1 to 2.3 per million vaccinees (37) (Biken,
foundation for vaccination research, unpublished data ). One case of Guillain Barré
syndrome temporally related to JE vaccination has been reported in the United States
since 1984; however, this patient also had pharyngitis 3 weeks before the onset of
weakness and had a positive monospot test (DeFraites R, unpublished data ). A causal
relation between JE vaccination and temporally related neurologic events has not
been established in this or other cases.
Since 1989, an apparently new pattern of adverse reactions has been reported,
principally among travelers vaccinated in Australia, Europe, and North America
(35,38–39 )(Navy Environmental Health Center, unpublished data; Cambridge Self Di-
agnostic Services, unpublished data; and Andersen MM, Rone T, personal
communication ) (Table 4). The reactions have been characterized by urticaria, often in
a generalized distribution, and/or angioedema of the extremities, face, and oro-
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pharynx, especially of the lips. Three vaccine recipients developed respiratory dis-
tress. Distress or collapse because of hypotension or other causes led to
hospitalization for several persons. Most reactions were treated successfully with an-
tihistamines or oral steroids; however some patients were hospitalized for parenteral
steroid therapy. Three patients developed associated erythema multiforme or
erythema nodosum, and some patients have had joint swelling. Some vaccinees have
complained of generalized itching without objective evidence of a rash. The immu-
nologic mechanism of these adverse events has not been defined. Additional
immunologic studies are pending.
An important feature of these reactions has been the interval between vaccination
and onset of symptoms. Reactions after a first vaccine dose occurred after a median
of 12 hours following vaccination (88% of reactions occurred within 3 days). The inter-
val between administration of a second dose and onset of symptoms generally was
longer (median 3 days) and possibly as long as 2 weeks. Reactions have occurred after
a second or third dose, when preceding doses were received uneventfully. Although
some observers have reported that reactions occur chiefly after a second or third
dose, one  prospective study found similar reaction rates after first and second doses
(Navy Environmental Health Center, unpublished data ).
A case-control study among U.S. military personnel found an association between
reactions to JE vaccine and a past history of urticaria (after hymenoptera envenoma-
tion, medications, physical or other provocations or of idiopathic cause [relative risk
9.1, 95% CI 1.8–50.9]) (Navy Environmental Health Center, unpublished data ).
Surveillance of adverse reactions during a mass immunization campaign of 35,000
active duty U.S. military personnel and their dependents on Okinawa disclosed the
sudden death of a 21-year-old man who had received a first dose of JE vaccine 60
hours earlier. He also had received a third dose of plague vaccine on the day of death.
The man had a medical history of recurrent hypersensitivity phenomena and an epi-
sode of possible anaphylaxis. He reported no antecedent symptoms before he was
found dead, and the cause of death was not established at autopsy.
The incidence of these adverse reactions has varied widely depending on the cir-
cumstances of vaccine administration and surveillance (Table 4). In two reports from
travelers’ clinics in Australia and Canada, rates of 50–104 per 10,000 vaccinees were
reported. National surveillance estimates in Denmark, Australia, the United Kingdom,
and Sweden are about 10-fold lower and range from 0.7 to 12 per 10,000. Studies
among U.S. citizens have disclosed rates of 15–62 per 10,000 (Table 4).
 Whether this pattern of adverse reactions is new for JE vaccine is unclear. Data
from Denmark and Australia suggest that this may be the case. From 1983 to Novem-
ber 1989, no such adverse reactions were reported to the Danish State Serum Institute
among recipients of 161,000 doses. From November, 1989 to June 1991, 19 cases were
reported among 62,000 vaccine recipients (p <10–6, Poisson) (38 ). Although JE vac-
cine had been distributed to 4,000 persons in Australia since 1987, the seven adverse
reactions meeting the above description were reported only after June 1990 (38 ).
Other patients with similar clinical features were reported from the United Kingdom in
1991, from Canada in 1990, and Sweden in the period from 1989–1990. However, in
retrospect, similar adverse events were observed in a JE vaccine trial conducted from
1983 to 1987 in the United States (17 ). One patient had an anaphylactic reaction oc-
curring within 5 minutes of vaccination; the other subject developed generalized
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urticaria 7 hours after vaccination. Although the latter case initially was diagnosed as
exercise-induced urticaria, a relation of the reaction to JE vaccine cannot be excluded.
The vaccine constituent(s) responsible for these adverse events has (have) not
been identified. Twelve of 45 vaccine lots produced from April 1988 to January 1991
have been associated with this pattern of adverse reactions. However, 26 of the re-
maining 33 lots were distributed exclusively to Asian countries. The absence of similar
reports associated with these lots may be related to differences in the sensitivity of
surveillance for adverse reactions, variations in susceptibility of vaccinees in Asia, or
other lot variations. Therefore, whether the reactogenicity of JE vaccine produced re-
cently is associated only with certain lots, or whether a uniform pattern of
reactogenicity has gone undetected, is uncertain.
Post-marketing surveillance for adverse reactions occurring in the United States
will be established by the manufacturer.
TABLE 4. Hypersensitivity reactions* following immunization with inactivated
Japanese encephalitis virus vaccine (Biken)










Denmark 16 † 13† 17,500   7 4–13
32 †  2§  7,500   3 0.3–9.6
33   2 10,000   2 0.2–7.2
12   4  6,500   6 1.7–16
Sweden¶ 30   1 15,000   0.7 .02–3.7
United Kingdom 13   1  1,950   5 0.13–29
Australia
Nationwide (9**),17,42 ††  4††  3,400  **12†† 3–30
 Fairfield Hospital 17,42   3    601  50 10–140
Canada
Nationwide 32,54   3    NA  NA NA
 Univ. of Calgary 32   1    96 104 2.6–567
United States
Travelers (CDC) NA ††  2§§  1,328  15 1.8–54
Active duty army 29,30,31 ††  1¶¶    526  19 0.5–105
Active duty military
 & dependents
 (Okinawa) 49,55 220 35,253  62 54–71
 *Generalized urticaria or angioedema.
†One additional case of erythema multiforme.
§One additional case of erythema nodosum.
¶Two cases, lots unknown.
**Use unknown.
††Lots unknown for four cases; estimated rate is based on total number of vaccinees.
§§Puffy eyes reported; not documented to have urticaria.
¶¶One case diagnosed as exercise-induced anaphylaxis; one case of generalized anaphylaxis.
NA – Not available
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VACCINE USAGE
U.S. Expatriates
JE vaccine is recommended for persons who plan to reside in areas where JE is
endemic or epidemic (residence during a transmission season) (40–44 ). Risk for ac-
quiring JE is highly variable within the endemic regions (Table 1, Figure 1). The
incidence of JE in the location of intended residence, the conditions of housing, nature
of activities, and the possibility of unexpected travel to high-risk areas are factors that
should be considered in the decision to seek vaccination.
Travelers
JE vaccine is NOT recommended for all travelers to Asia. In general, vaccine should
be offered to persons spending a month or longer in endemic areas during the trans-
mission season, especially if travel will include rural areas. Under specific
circumstances, vaccine should be considered for persons spending <30 days in en-
demic areas, e.g., travelers to areas experiencing epidemic transmission and persons
whose activities, such as extensive outdoor activities in rural areas, place them at high
risk for exposure. In all instances, travelers should be advised to take personal precau-
tions; e.g., to reduce exposure to mosquito bites.
The decision to use JE vaccine should balance the risks for exposure to the virus
(Table 1, Figure 1) and for developing illness, the availability and acceptability of repel-
lents and other alternative protective measures (44 ), and the side effects of
vaccination. Risk assessments should be interpreted cautiously (Table 1, Figure 1)
since risk can vary within areas and from year to year and available data are incom-
plete. Estimates suggest that risk of JE in highly endemic areas during the
transmission season can reach 1 per 5,000 per month of exposure; risk for most short-
term travelers may be ≤1 per million. Although JE vaccine is reactogenic, rates of
serious allergic reactions (generalized urticaria or angioedema) are low (1 to 104 per
10,000). Advanced age may be a risk factor for developing symptomatic illness after
infection. JE acquired during pregnancy carries the potential for intrauterine infection
and fetal death. These special factors should be considered when advising elderly per-
sons and pregnant women who plan visits to areas where JE is endemic.
Primary Immunization Schedule
The recommended primary immunization series is three doses of 1.0 mL each, ad-
ministered subcutaneously on days 0, 7, and 30. An abbreviated schedule of days 0, 7,
and 14 can be used when the longer schedule is impractical or inconvenient because
of time constraints. Two doses administered a week apart will confer short-term im-
munity among 80% of vaccinees (Table 3). However, this schedule should be used only
under unusual circumstances and is not routinely recommended. The last dose should
be administered at least 10 days before the commencement of travel to ensure an
adequate immune response and access to medical care in the event of delayed ad-
verse reactions.
The immunization schedule for children 1-3 years of age is identical except that the
manufacturer recommends 0.5 mL administered subcutaneously. No data are avail-
able on vaccine safety and efficacy in infants <1 year of age.
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Booster Doses
Protective levels of neutralizing antibody persist for at least 2 years in vaccinees
who have completed a three-dose primary series. The full duration of protection is
unknown, therefore, definitive recommendations cannot be given on the timing of
booster doses. Booster doses of 1.0 mL (0.5 mL for children <3 years of age) may be
administered after 2 years.
PRECAUTIONS AND CONTRAINDICATIONS
Adverse Reactions and Hypersensitivity
Adverse reactions to JE vaccine manifesting as generalized urticaria and
angioedema have occurred within minutes to as long as 2 weeks after vaccination.
Epinephrine and other medications and equipment to treat anaphylaxis should be
available. Vaccinees should be observed for 30 minutes after vaccination and warned
about the possibility of delayed urticaria and angioedema of the head and airway.
Vaccinees should be advised to remain in areas with ready access to medical care in
the 10 days after receiving a dose of JE vaccine.
Persons with a history of certain allergic disorders (see ADVERSE REACTIONS) ap-
pear to have a greater risk for developing adverse reactions to JE vaccine. This history
should be considered when weighing the risks and benefits of the vaccine for an indi-
vidual patient. When patients with such a history are offered JE vaccine, they should
be alerted to their increased risk for reaction and monitored appropriately. There are
no data supporting the efficacy of prophylactic antihistamines or steroids in prevent-
ing JE vaccine-related allergic reactions.
JE vaccine is produced in mouse brains and should not be administered to persons
with a proven or suspected hypersensitivity to proteins of rodent or neural origin
(other vaccines produced in rodent neural tissue include experimental hantaviral vac-
cines produced in Korea and the PRC and the previously used French neurotropic
strain yellow fever vaccine [discontinued in 1982]). Hypersensitivity to thimerosal is a
contraindication to vaccination.
The vaccine should not be administered to persons who have had a previous ad-
verse reaction after receiving JE vaccine. Patients who develop allergic or unusual
adverse reactions after vaccination should be reported through the Vaccine Adverse
Event Reporting System (1-800-822-7967).
Age
No data are available on the safety and efficacy of JE vaccine among infants <1 year
of age. Whenever possible vaccination of infants should be deferred until they are ≥1
year of age.
Pregnancy
No specific information is available on the safety of JE vaccine in pregnancy. Vacci-
nation poses an unknown but theoretical risk to the developing fetus, and the vaccine
should not be routinely administered during pregnancy. Pregnant women who must
travel to an area where risk of JE is high should be vaccinated when the theoretical
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risks of immunization are outweighed by the risk of infection to the mother and devel-
oping fetus.
Altered Immune States
The only data on the use of inactivated JE vaccine in patients with altered immune
states come from a small study among children. These data did not suggest a
changed pattern of adverse reactions or immune response after vaccination (45 ).
Simultaneous Administration of Other Vaccines or Drugs
Limited data suggest that the immunogenicity and safety of JE vaccination is not
compromised by simultaneous administration with DTP vaccine (Nisalak A, unpub-
lished data ). No data exist on the effect of concurrent administration of other
vaccines, drugs (e.g., chloroquine, mefloquine), or biologicals on the safety and im-
munogenicity of JE vaccine.
VACCINATION OF RESEARCH LABORATORY WORKERS
Twenty-two cases of laboratory-acquired JE have been reported (46 ). Although
work with JE virus is restricted to facilities with BL-3 capabilities, JE virus may be
transmitted in a laboratory setting through needlesticks and other accidental expo-
sures. Vaccine-derived immunity presumably protects against exposure through
these percutaneous routes. Exposure to aerosolized JE virus, and particularly to high
concentrations of virus, that may occur during viral purification, potentially could lead
to infection through mucous membranes and possibly directly into the central nerv-
ous system through the olfactory epithelium. Whether vaccine-derived immunity
protects against such exposures is unknown, but vaccination is recommended for all
laboratory workers with a potential for exposure to infectious JE virus.
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